Inside the fall of India’s ‘Maoist capital’: How policing, politics and a secret letter ended a 45-year insurgency
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Context
An opinion article details the decline of a 45-year Maoist insurgency in India's Dandakaranya forests, particularly in the Abujhmad region, once considered a 'liberated zone'. The analysis attributes this success to a combination of enhanced security measures, internal dissent within the Maoist leadership, and a crucial shift in local tribal support towards the state. The author highlights that the establishment of police camps, improved intelligence, and a loss of local support culminated in the insurgency's collapse.
UPSC Perspectives
Governance & Security
The article showcases the success of India's multi-pronged strategy against Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), which combines security action with development. The government's approach is exemplified by the SAMADHAN doctrine, an eight-point strategy launched in 2017 that focuses on aspects like aggressive strategy, actionable intelligence, and harnessing technology. The establishment of a dense network of Forward Operating Posts (FOBs) or camps deep inside Maoist territory, a policy that gained momentum recently, has been a game-changer. These camps serve a dual purpose: they disrupt Maoist supply lines and free movement, and they extend the state's administrative reach, providing security to the local population and enabling development activities. This 'Clear, Hold, and Build' strategy allows security forces to deny sanctuary to insurgents while government services win the trust of the local populace, a crucial element in defeating any insurgency. UPSC can ask about the key components of India's anti-LWE strategy and the role of different security forces in its implementation.
Social & Local Governance
A critical factor in the decline of the Maoist movement is the erosion of its social support base among tribal communities. The article points to a shift in the "collective tribal consciousness" since 2012-13, leading to locals, including former Maoists, providing crucial human intelligence (HumanInt). This shift was facilitated by the state's presence through security camps, which reduced fear of reprisal. The role of the District Reserve Guard (DRG) is paramount here. The DRG is a special police unit comprising local tribal youths, including surrendered Maoists, who possess intimate knowledge of the terrain, language, and culture. This 'son of the soil' approach not only improves operational effectiveness but also creates a bridge between the state and the community, countering Maoist propaganda. The success of the DRG highlights the importance of community-centric policing and leveraging local knowledge in counter-insurgency. This also ties into the effective implementation of acts like the and the , which aim to empower tribal communities and address historical grievances that fuel extremism.
Institutional & Operational
The operational effectiveness of security forces has been significantly enhanced by specialized units and inter-agency coordination. The article mentions the Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA), an elite unit of the , which specializes in jungle warfare and has been at the forefront of establishing camps in remote areas. The combination of central forces like CoBRA and state-level forces like the DRG creates a formidable security grid. Furthermore, the use of technology, such as drones, satellite assistance, and intelligence processing software, has acted as a force multiplier. The article underscores that while technology is important, the core of the success has been 'HumanInt', which became available due to a change in public perception and infighting within the Maoist ranks. This highlights a key tenet of counter-insurgency: military success is contingent upon winning the support of the people, which in turn leads to better intelligence and isolates the insurgents from their support base.