Article 19(2) is a crucial provision in the Indian Constitution that defines the limits of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed to all citizens under Article 19(1)(a). It is not an act or a scheme, but a constitutional clause that empowers the State to impose "reasonable restrictions" on this freedom.
The provision was significantly shaped by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which was enacted to solve a problem created by early judicial interpretations. The Supreme Court, in cases like Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950), had invalidated government attempts to curb speech on grounds like "public safety". To restore the State's ability to maintain order, the First Amendment broadened the scope of restrictions by explicitly adding the grounds of "public order" and "incitement to an offence" to the clause.
Article 19(2) works by providing an exhaustive list of eight grounds on which the State can make a law to restrict free speech. These grounds are: sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence. The restriction must be "reasonable," meaning it cannot be arbitrary or excessive, and must have a direct and proximate nexus with the ground invoked.
This provision connects directly to criminal laws like the former Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which dealt with sedition. While the IPC's sedition law was limited by the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) to only cover expressions inciting violence or public disorder, it has been replaced by Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which penalizes acts endangering the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India.
A key recent development occurred on January 3, 2023, when a five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the grounds listed in Article 19(2) are exhaustive, confirming that no other restrictions can be imposed on a citizen's freedom of speech. This ruling reinforces the principle that the State cannot invent new grounds to limit free expression.