Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) is a concept that forms the cornerstone of India's nuclear doctrine. It is a policy of restraint that aims to maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient to inflict "unacceptable damage" in retaliation, thereby deterring an adversary, without engaging in an open-ended arms race. The tentative doctrine was announced on August 17, 1999, by Brajesh Mishra, Secretary of the National Security Advisory Board, following the 1998 Pokhran-II tests. The doctrine was formally adopted by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on January 4, 2003, to establish a responsible and defensive nuclear posture.
The mechanism of CMD is built on three pillars: the deterrent force, the posture, and the command structure. The force must be Sufficient and Survivable to guarantee a retaliatory strike, which is ensured by a nuclear triad of land-based missiles, air-delivered weapons, and submarine-launched missiles. The posture is defined by a No First Use (NFU) commitment, meaning nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces anywhere. This retaliation is mandated to be "massive" and designed to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the aggressor. The command structure connects to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), where the civilian political leadership, through the Political Council chaired by the Prime Minister, is the sole body authorized to sanction the use of nuclear weapons.
The core concept of CMD is intrinsically linked to the NFU policy and the Massive Retaliation principle. While the core doctrine remains unchanged, the NFU commitment was modified to retain the option of nuclear retaliation in the event of a major attack with biological or chemical weapons. Recent technological advancements, such as the shift to cannisterised systems for missiles, have increased the operational readiness of the arsenal, but the official doctrine of Credible Minimum Deterrence and Massive Retaliation remains central.